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Abstract—Web cookies are ubiquitously used to track and
profile the behavior of users. Although there is a solid empirical
foundation for understanding the use of cookies in the global
world wide web, thus far, limited attention has been devoted for
country-specific and company-level analysis of cookies. To patch
this limitation in the literature, this paper investigates persistent
third-party cookies used in the Finnish web. The exploratory re-
sults reveal some similarities and interesting differences between
the Finnish and the global web—in particular, popular Finnish
web sites are mostly owned by media companies, which have
established their distinct partnerships with online advertisement
companies. The results reported can be also reflected against
current and future privacy regulation in the European Union.
Index Terms—privacy, tracking cookie, persistent cookie,
third-party cookie, media industry, newspapers, Finland, EU
I. INTRODUCTION
This short empirical paper surveys the use of persistent
cookies in the contemporary Finnish world wide web. The
term Finnish web is understood as a sub-population of popular
web sites that are primarily designed for Finnish users, using
Finnish as the primary language for the content. This pre-
viously unused country-specific focus establishes the paper’s
contribution to the existing empirical cookie research. Another
contribution is made with a company-level analysis, which re-
veals interesting patterns in the relationships between Finnish
media companies and global online advertisement companies.
II. EXPLORATORY ANALYSIS
A. Data
The sample contains 10, 240 persistent cookies that were
collected from 206 popular Finnish web sites. The sampling
from a little over two hundred sites is on the small side; prior
studies have collected cookies from a ten or even a hundred
thousand web sites [1], [2], [3]. While such numbers are nec-
essary when attempting to infer about the global world wide
web, the number of web sites sampled is reasonable because
the Finnish web is relatively small and highly concentrated in
terms of popularity. Current estimates from early 2017 indicate
that the two most popular sites (is.fi and yle.fi) both
had a weekly reach of about two million Finnish people [4],
which is nearly forty percent of the whole population in
Finland. Given the high concentration, it is a reasonable
assumption that sampling from the 206 most popular web sites
generalize well toward the statistical “population” of Finnish
people who visit Finnish web sites at least once a week.
The web sites used for the cookie harvesting were collected
from the weekly popularity statistics maintained by the Finnish
market research company Kantar TNS Oy [4]. Although
the methodological details are proprietary, the company uses
cookie-based tracking, traffic analysis, and other means to
rank the popularity of Finnish sites. Unlike Alexa Internet,
whose popularity lists have been used in previous cookie
research [2], [3], [5], [6], TNS uses also survey data from
Finnish web users, which presumably further increases the
robustness of the popularity ranks. Given these supposedly
rather reliable ranks, the sampled web sites were collected by
merging all unique sites that were ranked between 2000 and
2017, using the first week of January as the annual reference.
The persistent cookies from the popular web sites sampled
were collected in 14 April 2017 with Firefox version 45.8.0,
using the browser’s default settings. All cookies were retrieved
from Firefox’s cookies.sqlite file, and after each visit,
all Firefox-specific data was deleted from a local hard disk.
Finally, a ten second waiting time was used between visits in
order to ensure that full contents were successfully retrieved.
B. First and Third Parties
Cookies can be divided into session cookies and persistent
cookies. Due to the limitations in the hypertext transfer pro-
tocol (HTTP), session cookies are generally required for most
current web applications for maintaining state information.
Such cookies are erased when a browser is closed, whereas
persistent cookies are retained across multiple browser ses-
sions. All cookies observed in this paper are persistent.
Persistent cookies allow storing users’ preference of a web
site, but these are frequently used also for tracking and pro-
filing of users. The further distinction between first-party and
third-party cookies reflects this dual functionality implicitly.
According to the same origin policy used by web browsers,
an HTTP request made by a browser contains only those
cookies whose domain attribute matches the domain name of
the request (see [7] and [8] for summaries of the technical and
historical background). When querying hs.fi, for instance,
the cookies set for the domains adtech.de and hs.fi
are third-party and first-party cookies, respectively. The cross-
domain sharing of information between the two domains can
occur in multiple ways, but in a typical scenario hs.fi would
contain advertisements served from the domain adtech.de.
Given this background, it is telling to start the exploration
with an observation that about 91.4 % of cookies in the
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sample are third-party. The rate is higher than what has been
observed in the global web [2], [3]. As an outlook on the
actual third-party domains, Fig. 1 summarizes the amount of
third-party cookies set for particular domains (outer plot) and
the distribution of third-party cookies per web site (inner plot).
To further examine the hypothesis that increasing popularity
would entail heavy use of cookies [3], Table I shows also
correlation coefficients between the number of third-party
cookies and five popularity metrics made available by TNS [4].
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Fig. 1. A Summary of Third-Party Cookies Used in the Finnish Web
TABLE I
CORRELATIONS BETWEEN THE NUMBER OF THIRD-PARTY
COOKIES AND FIVE POPULARITY METRICS (PEARSON r)
Rank Users Browsers Sessions Page views
r −0.02 0.09 0.07 0.09 0.09
Nota bene: all metric values are averages from the eight weekly
snapshots used for the sampling (see Section II-A). The five popularity
metrics are: TNS’s popularity rank (akin to Alexa); average weekly
reach among 15–74 year old Finnish people; and the average weekly
number of browsers, sessions, and page views, in the order of listing.
Three observations can be made from the results. First
and foremost, the use of third-party cookies is extensive but
varies across sites. While most Finnish sites use less than
50 third-party cookies, there are sites storing even up to
200 persistent third-party cookies. These numbers alone are
enough to raise some privacy concerns. Second, the most
frequent tracking domains show some divergence from the
global web (cf. [2], [6], [9]). For instance, Rubiconproject is
the clear leader, while Google’s doubleclick.net takes
only the fourth place. Last, the correlation coefficients reported
are all modest: the popularity of Finnish web sites neither
increases nor decreases the amount of third-party cookies.
C. Media Companies and Their Tracking Partners
Genre analysis has been one way to shed further light
on persistent third-part cookies [2], [6], [10]. With few e-
commerce and social media platforms thrown in, the most
popular Finnish web sites are online versions of newspapers,
periodicals, and television channels. Almost all of these are
either owned by media companies or, in the case of yle.fi,
the state. Therefore, in the present context a slightly better
classification can be done according to the owners of the sites.
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Fig. 2. The Most Popular Finnish Sites According to Top-10 Owners
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Fig. 3. Pruned Third-Party Cookie Network of Top-8 Web Site Owners
According to the results summarized in Fig. 2, most of the
web sites sampled are owned by publishing companies. Also
the average number of third-party cookies set by the web sites
vary according to the companies. In particular, the web sites
owned by the publishing company Alma Media seem to set
an extensive amount of third-party cookies. Some of these
are used for sharing cross-domain information between the
company’s web sites (for instance, talouselama.fi stores
a third-party cookie for iltalehti.fi, which is natural as
both newspaper sites are owned by Alma Media). Many of
the third-party cookies are set for known trackers, however.
For visualizing the main trackers, Fig. 3 displays a bipartite
network of the main tracking domains across eight companies.
Interestingly, not all of the companies are using the same
trackers; again, the web sites owned by Alma Media use a
few trackers not used by the other media companies.
D. Values
The following listing raises a few illuminating points about
the values stored to the persistent cookies collected.
• As many as 86 web sites—about 40 % of the web sites
sampled—store the Internet protocol address used for the
collecting in plain-text to third-party cookies.
• Furthermore, two web sites store a private locate area
network address (10.218.140.241) to a third-party
cookie (rubiconproject.com) in plain text. This
address may denote the server that was used for delivering
the web content, but other scenarios are also possible.
• Numerous sites store the visiting time in plain-text either
as a timestamp or as a calendar time string. One site stores
the user-agent string to a third-party cookie in plain text.
• Five web sites store some fragments from a “GeoIP” iden-
tification to third-party cookies; the geographic location
used for the queries (Helsinki) appears in plain text.
• It is dreadful to end the enumeration with an observation
that two popular sites store session and login information
in plain text to first-party cookies. The stored information
includes user name, user’s first name, last name, com-
pany, and address, as well as session identifiers.
These details indicate that quite a few tracking web sites
do not bother to follow the basic guideline about hashing
the values stored to cookies. Potential privacy leaks are also
present. While addresses and geographic locations are leaked
to third-party sites also via many other channels (such as
advertisements served via iframe’s), some of the plain-text
information stored to third-party cookies hint about further
tracking efforts via browser fingerprinting (cf. [11]). The last
point in the listing raises also security concerns, which are
also evident by further taking a look on the cookie attributes.
E. Attributes
The following brief observations can be made about the
optional attributes set for the persistent cookies harvested.
• If the so-called “Secure” attribute is set for a cookie, the
cookie should be transmitted only via secured (HTTPS)
requests [12]. Only 0.33 % of the cookies collected have
set this binary attribute. This negligible share is practi-
cally identical to the share (0.36 %) recently observed in
a sample collected from the global world wide web [2].
• If the so-called “HttpOnly” attribute is set for a cookie,
the cookie should not be accessible through client-side
(in-browser) scripts [12]. This optional attribute was
originally introduced by Microsoft in the early 2000s for
preventing a certain class of cross-site scripting (XSS)
attacks [13]. Alas, adoption has been slow: according
to empirical surveys, the estimated global adoption rates
range from 6.5 % [2] to 33.5 % [14]. The modest adoption
rate applies also to the contemporary Finnish web: only
about 7.5 % of the cookies observed have set this flag.
• The so-called “path” attribute can be used to restrict
the scope of a cookie to specific web server directories.
When the path is either not specified or it is set to the
web server root (/), a given cookie is submitted by
a browser to all web applications accessible from the
same domain name. Therefore, a basic risk relates to
using unrestricted cookies for a deployment that contains
security-critical and other web applications in different
directories [15]. Akin to the previous two attributes,
however, about 99.4 % of the cookies observed have a
root-level scope. This share is again comparable to a rate
(98.4 %) seen in a cookie sample from the global web [2].
• The “expiration” attribute can be used to announce when
a given cookie should be invalidated by a browser.
When using the date of collecting as the other reference
point, the lifetime of the cookies observed is relatively
short, although the distribution visualized in Fig. 4 is
skewed due to two sites announcing expiration dates in
31-12-9999. This said, the median lifetime of third-
party cookies is about six months, which is clearly
above the one month cut-off point sometimes used for
separating transient cookies from tracking cookies [5].
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    RFC 6265:
        "Although servers can set the expiration date for cookies
          to the distant future, most user agents do not actually
          retain cookies for multiple decades. Rather than choosing
          gratuitously long expiration periods, servers SHOULD
          promote user privacy by selecting reasonable cookie
          expiration periods based on the purpose of the cookie."
Median lifetime of first-party cookies = 1 day
Median lifetime of third-party cookies = 181 days
Fig. 4. The Cookie Lifetimes According to Expiry Dates
A good way to summarize the cookie attributes is the
concept of maximal permissions, which are satisfied whenever
cookies are persistent and non-secure with root-level scope [9].
According to this definition, as much as 99.1 % of the
cookies observed have maximal permissions. It should be also
remarked that the attributes outlined may be used primarily in
cookies set during authentication to web applications [2], [16].
Although such cases are not present in the sample, it is fair to
tentatively conclude that cookie attributes are mostly ignored
by the web sites sampled, which is unfortunate as these provide
some security benefits for both servers and clients.
F. Do Not Track
The so-called “do not track” (DNT) initiative was first
proposed in 2007, and the controversy has endured ever since.
Industrial adoption has been slow [5]. Although DNT does
not block third-party cookies as such, it is interesting to
briefly examine whether the number of third-party cookies
vary according to whether DNT is enabled or disabled. The
results visualized in Fig. 5 are based on repeating the cookie
collection routine (see Section II-A) with DNT enabled in
Firefox (the y-axis and x-axis display the number of third-
party cookies with DNT disabled and enabled, respectively).
To read the figure, values above the diagonal line are
“good for privacy” in the sense that enabling DNT resulted
fewer third-party cookies. While some of the web sites indeed
store fewer third-party cookies with DNT, many sites are also
located below the diagonal, meaning that actually more third-
party cookies were stored upon enabling DNT in Firefox. As
a concrete example: when DNT is announced by a browser,
some web sites store a value “DNT2” to third-party cookies
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Fig. 5. Number of Third-Party Cookies with DNT Enabled and Disabled
set for the domain exelator.com. All in all, however, the
regression line shown is close to the diagonal line, meaning
that DNT does not entail a noteworthy difference.
III. DISCUSSION
This short empirical paper explored the use of cookies in
the Finnish web. Like everywhere, (a) the use of third-party
tracking cookies is rampant in the Finnish web. According
to the results, it also seems that (b) the Finnish web does
not differ notably from the global web in terms of cookie
attributes, but (c) there are some eminent differences in terms
of the online advertisement companies used by the owners of
popular Finnish web sites. It is also evident that (d) some of
these owners prefer partnerships with smaller advertisement
companies instead of relying on the global market leaders.
Finally, (e) web site popularity and the “do not track” initiative
do not statistically explain the amount of third-party cookies.
Almost all of the Finnish web sites sampled display a
notification about the use of cookies, following the regula-
tion imposed by the European Union (EU) regarding user
consent for the use of cookies (see [17] and [18] for the
legal background). Many Finnish web site also point toward
the European industry consortium that allows users to opt-
out from tracking—by ironically installing a further tracking
cookie [19]. As such opt-out solutions are dubious in many
respects [20], further legislative amendments may be required
as an alternative to industry self-regulation. For instance: if the
EU privacy regulation continues to require consent from users,
it might be worthwhile to also mandate web site owners to
explicitly enumerate all domains stored to third-party cookies.
Another question is how well the Finnish web sites and their
users truly understand the security and privacy consequences
from serving content from third-party domains.
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